We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our result covers as special cases those in which the agent has no private information -i.e., pure moral hazard -as well as those in which the agent's only action is a participation decision -i.e., pure adverse selection. We allow multi-dimensional actions and signals, as well as both …nancial and non-…nancial rewards. Beyond measurability, we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms. Consequently, our optimal mechanisms are optimal among all measurable mechanisms. A key to obtaining our result is to permit randomized mechanisms. We also provide conditions under which randomization is unnecessary.
Introduction
In his classic work on the principal-agent problem, Mirrlees (1976 Mirrlees ( , 1999 identi…es at least two important theoretical questions. The …rst is the question of the existence of an optimal incentive contract. Somewhat surprisingly, within even the most standard economic settings (e.g., logarithmic utility, normally distributed signals) Mirrlees shows that an optimal contract need not exist.
The second question relates to the character of the optimal contract when one does exist. Here Mirrlees introduces the "…rst-order approach" (FOA) in which the agent's (possibly in…nite number of) incentive constraints is replaced with the single constraint that the e¤ort level targeted by the principal is a critical point of the agent's objective function. Much research has focused on providing conditions under which the FOA can be employed (see, e.g., Rogerson (1985) , Jewitt (1988) , Sinclair-Desgagne (1994), Conlon (2009) ). But even the current state-of-the-art conditions are highly restrictive.
Our focus here is on the …rst of Mirrlees' questions, that of the existence of a solution to the principal's problem. However, our setting is more general. Speci…cally, an agent has a privately known type and a must choose an action. The principal presents the agent with a menu of contracts, We thank John Conlon and Wojciech Olszewski for helpful comments, and Max Stinchcombe for being especially generous with his time in discussing the paper with Swinkels during his Fall 2009 visit to UT Austin. We also thank Timothy Van Zandt for providing a number of very helpful comments in his thorough discussion of our paper at the 2011 ASSA/Econometric Society meetings in Denver. Reny gratefully acknowledges …nancial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0922535), as well as the hospitality of MEDS at Northwestern University during his 2009-2010 visit.
y Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis z Department of Economics, University of Chicago x Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University where each contract speci…es a reward for the agent as a function of a signal whose distribution depends on the agent's action and type. After the agent chooses a contract from the menu and takes an action, the signal is generated and the contract is honored. 1 Thus, our setting includes as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection, but in general allows for combinations of the two. 2 The question addressed here is, "Under what conditions does a menu of contracts exist that maximizes the principal's ex-ante expected payo¤ subject to the agent's interim individual rationality constraints?"
We establish existence without imposing the restrictive conditions (e.g., one-dimensional signals and rewards, monotone likelihood ratio conditions, additively separable utility in rewards and actions, etc.) that are typical for the validity of the FOA. Similar to Holmström and Milgrom (1987, 1991) we allow multi-dimensional e¤ort, signals, and rewards. Rewards may take the form of cash, promotions, restricted stock, or a nicer o¢ ce. Unlike Holmström and Milgrom (1987, 1991 ),
we do not restrict attention to a particular functional form of utility nor do we impose a particular statistical relationship between the agent's actions and the information received by the principal.
We allow substantial ‡exibility in how the set of feasible rewards varies with the signal, as for example when a …rm cannot contract to pay its manager more than some fraction of the total value of the …rm. Finally, we allow the payo¤ of both the principal and agent to depend in a non-seperable way on the type of the agent, the action chosen, the signal, and the reward, with no order structure on either object. As such, our model incorporates, for example, a setting where the type of the agent is information about which of several projects is better, and the action of the agent and the "reward"of the principal consist of which project to focus their respective e¤orts on.
In such an example, the payo¤s of the agent and principal may well have a substantial component of common interest.
Even in the special case of pure moral hazard, establishing the existence of an optimal contract under general conditions has proven to be surprisingly di¢ cult. The central issue is that the set of all possible contracts as typically conceived is not compact in a useful topology, i.e., one in which the participants'payo¤s are continuous. For instance, Mirrlees'(1999) counterexample involves a sequence of contracts along which extreme punishments are in ‡icted at extremely low performance thresholds, and along which the principal's payo¤ approaches the full-information optimum. But, no contract can attain full-information optimum payo¤s.
To restore compactness, Holmström (1979) begins by introducing upper and lower bounds on feasible payments. But, even with such bounds, the set of contracts is not usefully compact.
Holmström thus also imposes a bounded variation restriction on contracts. While this delivers an existence result, the bounded variation restriction is ad hoc -there is no guarantee that otherwise reasonable contracts that do not meet the variation bound or the bounds on feasible payments 1 No mechanism can improve upon a menu of contracts, which itself is equivalent to the principal conditioning the contract he o¤ers the agent on the agent's report of his type. We will take this latter direct mechanism approach in the sequel. See Section 3. 2 Examples of the latter sort of model can be found in Hellwig (2010), Tirole (1986, 1993) , Walsh (1995) .
would not be better for the principal. In a model with substantively more general actions, signals, and preferences, Page (1987) takes a similar route to existence, again introducing upper and lower bounds on payments, and assuming that the set of feasible contracts is a priori restricted so as to be sequentially compact in the topology of pointwise convergence. Again, however, there is no guarantee that contracts outside the pre-speci…ed set would not be even better.
In contrast, Grossman and Hart (1983) establish existence of an optimum in the moral hazard problem without ad hoc restrictions on contracts. They do this by restricting attention to a …nite set of signals each of which occurs with probability bounded away from zero regardless of the agent's action. With a continuum of signals, Carlier and Dana (2005) and Jewitt, Kadan and Swinkels (2008) solve the existence problem while avoiding ad hoc restrictions on contracts by assuming that e¤ort is one-dimensional, that likelihood ratios are monotone and bounded, and that the FOA is valid. All three papers require signals and rewards to be one-dimensional and the principal's losses to be additively separable in them, and none permits the agent to possess private information.
A contract is typically de…ned as a function from signals to rewards. This is too restrictive in our general setting, where randomization over rewards may be strictly optimal for the principal.
Consequently, we allow contracts that randomize over rewards. But there is another-deeper-reason for allowing randomization. As our proof specialized to pure moral hazard reveals, randomization over rewards renders the set of all contracts whose costs to the prinicpal are uniformly bounded above, compact in a topology in which the principal's losses are lower semicontinuous. This insight builds on the ideas of Milgrom and Weber (1985) , who introduce the concept of distributional strategies to compactify the set of behavioral strategies in Bayesian games with continuum type spaces. 3 While permitting randomized contracts is crucial for our existence proof, the contracts in an optimal menu may or may not involve randomization. We establish conditions under which optimal menus can be composed of deterministic contracts and, in pure moral-hazard problems when, in addition, the cost minimizing contract for any given e¤ort level is unique. We also provide examples in which randomization is necessary for optimality. The latter can occur when, for example, the sets of signals and rewards are …nite.
Our results require two economically substantive assumptions, and several technical ones. The …rst substantive assumption is that the problem at hand can be formulated so that both the agent's utility and the principal's losses are bounded below (with the former ruling out the Mirrlees counterexample). Both restrictions appear to us to be exceedingly mild from an economic point of view, with the …rst being satis…ed if, for example, contracts with arbitrarily draconian punishments are unavailable, and the second being satis…ed if, for example, the gross bene…ts to the principal as a function of the agent's action have …nite expectation and the gross costs to the principal are bounded below.
Utility and losses are permitted to be unbounded above. This is important in particular because a priori upper bounds on payments are not easy to motivate. For example, it is easy to see why a CEO cannot be paid more than the value of the …rm, but it is less obvious why the value of the …rm should be bounded up front. Even if the problem at hand naturally leads to both utility and losses that are bounded, compactness of the space of contracts remains an issue that requires the techniques we introduce.
The second economically substantive assumption is that if the utility of the agent diverges along a sequence of rewards, the cost to the principal of providing that utility diverges even faster. When, for example, the wage is both the agent's reward and the …rm's cost, this assumption is satis…ed if the agent's marginal utility of wealth tends to zero as wealth increases without bound.
Our existence result is proven under two sets of hypotheses. In the …rst, we require that the support of the principal's signal is independent of the agent's action and private type. The resulting information structure is nonetheless quite general, and, in particular, it does not impose monotone likelihood ratio conditions or any other order structure on signals and/or actions.
The second set of hypotheses permits an even more general information structure, allowing, for example, signal supports that vary with the agent's action and type and that contain atoms.
However, while we still permit the agent's preferences over rewards to depend on his action and type and the signal generated, we require here that for any given signal there is a worst reward for the agent that is independent of his action and type.
Finally, we require several purely technical assumptions. The agent's action space is compact metric, the reward, type, and signal spaces are complete, separable, and metric. As functions of the signal, action, reward, and type, the agent's utility is jointly continuous and the principal's loss is jointly lower semicontinuous. Section 2 presents our assumptions on ambient spaces, payo¤s, and information. Several example are provided that illustrate the model's scope. Section 3 de…nes the spaces of contracts, menus, and mechanisms, and introduces the principal's problem. Section 4 states the main result and provides a sketch of the proof. The formal proof is given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides two results on when optimal contracts can be chosen to be deterministic, and provides examples in which optimality requires randomization.
The Model

Ambient Space and Payo¤ Assumptions
We maintain the following assumptions throughout.
Assumption 1
The set of actions, A; is a non-empty compact metric space.
Assumption 2
The set of signals, S; is a Polish space, i.e., a complete separable metric space.
Assumption 3
The set of rewards is a Polish space, R. For each s 2 S; (s) R is a nonempty set of feasible rewards given the signal s. We assume that = f(s; r) 2 S R : r 2 (s)g; the graph of the correspondence ; is a Borel subset of S R.
Assumption 4
The set of types, T; is a Polish space, and the prior on T is a Borel probability measure H. 4 Assumption 5 The agent has a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u : A T ! R that is bounded below, without loss of generality by 0:
The principal has a lower semicontinuous von Neumann-Morgenstern loss (disutility) function l : A T ! R that is bounded below, again without loss of generality by 0. Let P ( ja; t) denote the probability measure over the signal space S when the agent takes action a 2 A and his type is t 2 T: We present and discuss our assumptions on P in section 2.3.
Examples and Discussion
The model reduces to pure moral hazard when the type space, T; is a singleton, and reduces to pure adverse selection when the action space, A; contains just two elements, "participate" and "don't participate," re ‡ecting an interim IR constraint.
The model is intended to be as general as possible. Actions come from a compact space, but signals and rewards need not, and all three can be multi-dimensional (even in…nite-dimensional) and perhaps discrete in some dimensions while continuous in others. No order structure is assumed on action, signal, or reward spaces. Even when a natural order exists, no monotonicity of payo¤s is assumed. Our most economically signi…cant assumption is that the agent's utility and the principal's losses are bounded below.
Each of the following examples satis…es all of the assumptions above as well as the informational assumptions in Section 2.3.
for all s; A = [0; 1]; and l (s; r; a; t) = r s; where s is revenue, r is monetary compensation, and a is e¤ ort. Let u (s; r; a; t) = w (r; a) where w ( ; ) is continuous, and assume that P ( ja) admits a positive density, f (sja); continuous in s and a: This yields the standard moral hazard problem, save that payments are bounded below and that there is no M LRP restriction on the information structure. When w (r; a) = v (r) c (a) we obtain the commonly employed case in which the agent's utility is separable in money, v ( ) ; and cost of e¤ ort, c ( ) :
The requirement that losses are bounded below may seem restrictive, as it appears to rule out arbitrarily large returns to the principal. In particular, Example 1 does not immediately admit cases in which the principal's revenue space is unbounded such as the exponential distribution example studied in Holmström (1979) or the case where P ( ja) represents the normal distribution with mean a and variance 1. However, as the next example illustrates, such cases are also often covered by our formulation, as long as the principal's expected revenue is bounded above. 6 Example 2 Pure Moral Hazard with Unbounded Returns. Assume that S = ( 1; 1) ;
The principal receives revenue s; and pays compensation r. Let u (s; r; a; t) = w (r; a) be continuous. If for some z; (a) = R sdP (sja) z for all a 2 A;
as would be the case if (a) were …nite and continuous in a on the compact set of actions A; then l (s; r; a) = r + z (a) is bounded below by zero (and happens to be independent of s):
When all spaces are Euclidean, assumption 7 states that as rewards become unbounded, so does the loss to the principal. Finally, assumption 8 says that the losses to the principal per util provided are unbounded above when they provide the agent with arbitrarily high utility. Note that if the agent's utility is bounded, assumption 8 is satis…ed trivially, regardless of the risk preferences of the principal and agent. 7 In the next two examples, there is a …xed z 2 R such that 1] , and which of three styles of sales pitch to employ. Thus, 6 Situations in which the agent's utility is unbounded below in s can similarly often be brought into the con…nes of our model. 7 Even if utility can diverge, assumption 8 imposes only a very weak form of asymptotic diminishing returns. The agent can, for example, be risk seeking over an arbitrarily large range of rewards. Example 5 Pure Adverse Selection. Let S = fsg be a singleton. The principal is a monopolist producing a good of quality q 2 q; q at a continuous cost (q) for a price p 2 [0; p] : The agent is a consumer with a private taste parameter for quality t 2 T , where T is a subset of an Euclidean space, with prior H ( ) : A reward to the agent is a price-quality pair r = (p; q). Thus, R = (s) = [0; p] q; q : The agent chooses whether or not to buy the good, i.e., A = fbuy, don't buyg : If the agent buys at price-quality pair (p; q); the loss to the principal is l (s; r; a; t) = (q) p and the utility to the agent is u (s; r; a; t) = v (q; t) p; where v is a continuous function representing the bene…t to the agent from consuming a good with quality q given taste t: If the agent does not buy, both principal and agent receive a payo¤ of zero.
The next example illustrates a mixed moral hazard/adverse selection setup. 
Information and Rewards
We now turn to our information structure. Our …rst assumption imposes a mild form of continuity of information in a and t:
Assumption 9 If a n ! a; and t n ! t; then P ( ja n ; t n ) ! P ( ja; t); where convergence of measures is in the weak topology.
In general, we allow the supports of signals to vary with a and t: But, our next assumption requires that where supports overlap, they satisfy a form of absolute continuity. On the other hand, we do not require any form of monotone likelihood ratio property. Indeed, we impose no order structure on either A or S.
Assumption 10 For every a 2 A and every t 2 T there is a Borel subset S a;t of S such that P (S a;t ja; t) = 1 and P ( ja 0 ; t 0 ) is absolutely continuous with respect to P ( ja; t) on S a;t for every a 0 2 A and t 0 2 T: 8
Assumption 10 is much weaker than assuming that P ( ja 0 ; t 0 ) is absolutely continuous with respect to P ( ja; t); because we ask for absolute continuity only on S a;t : It is also weaker than assuming that P ( ja 0 ; t 0 ) is absolutely continuous with respect to P ( ja; t) on the support of P ( ja; t)
because S a;t need not be closed and hence may be a strict subset of the support of P ( ja; t): Example 8 below illustrates the usefulness of this.
Assumption 10 implies, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, that for all a; a 0 2 A and all t; t 0 2 T;
there is a measurable function, ( ; a 0 ; t 0 ; a; t) : S ! R such that P (Bja 0 ; t 0 ) = R B (s; a 0 ; t 0 ; a; t)dP (sja; t) for every measurable B contained in S a;t : We require that the Radon-Nikodym derivative, ; can be chosen to be well-behaved in the following sense.
Assumption 11 is lower semicontinuous at (s; a 0 ; t 0 ; a; t) whenever (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a; t) :
Example 7 A Density. S is Euclidean and P ( ja; t) can be represented by a density f (sja; t)
where f : S A T ! R is continuous and everywhere strictly positive. In particular, here we can take S a;t = S for all a; t; and (s; a 0 ; t 0 ; a; t) = Example 9 Moving atom. Let A = S = [0; 1] ; T = ftg ; and let P ( ja; t) be the Dirac measure placing mass one on s = a: That is, a is observable. 11 Example 10 Discrete signal distributions. Suppose that S is a …nite set and that P (sja; t) is continuous in (a; t) for each s 2 S:
Each of these satis…es our assumptions. An example that does not is the following. 8 That is, P (Bja 0 ; t 0 ) = 0 for every Borel subset B of Sa;t such that P (Bja; t) = 0: 9 In examples of pure moral hazard, we will write simply (s; a 0 ; a) : 1 0 Note the usefulness, in terms of the lower semicontinuity of ; of allowing Sa;t to be (a; a + 1) as opposed to insisting that it be the entire support [a; a + 1] : 1 1 This example illustrates why we only ask that be lower semicontinuous where (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a; t) : In particular, (s = a; a 0 ; a) = 0 must hold for all a 0 6 = a; while (s = a; a; a) = 1; violating lower semicontinuity at that point.
T = ft 0 g, and u(s; r; a; t) = a + r: Suppose the principal sees the agent's action when it is strictly less than one, but not otherwise, i.e., the principal receives the signal s = a if a < 1 and s = 1 if a 1. Hence, assumption 11 is violated because (s; a 0 ; a) = 0 for (s; a 0 ; a) = (a; 2; a) with a < 1 while (1; 2; 1) = 1: Every action a 2 [0; 1); being observable, is implementable. However, action a = 1 is not implementable because it is indistinguishable by the principal from the action a = 2;
which is strictly preferred by the agent.
One can see the role of the lower semicontinuity of in this example. E¤ectively, as a ! 1; there is a discontinuous change in how much di¢ culty the principal has in rewarding action a without also giving the agent an incentive to deviate to a = 2: The role of lower semicontinuity is to ensure that, in a general sense, this does not occur.
Our main existence result requires that one of two additional assumptions is also satis…ed. The …rst places more structure on information, the second more structure on payo¤s.
Say that the environment has uniform information if the support of signals does not depend on a or t; i.e., if the following assumption holds.
Assumption 12
The set of signals S a;t can be chosen to be S for every a 2 A and t 2 T:
Assumptions 10 and 12 are equivalent to saying that P ( ja; t) is absolutely continuous with respect to P ( ja 0 ; t 0 ) for every (a; t) and (a 0 ; t 0 ): Example 7 satis…es this assumption. Examples 8 and 9 do not. When there is uniform information, no further structure is necessary for existence.
But, when the support of the distribution of signals varies, we require instead some extra structure on rewards. In particular, say that the environment has simple worst rewards if the following assumption on payo¤s holds.
Assumption 13
There is a measurable function r : S ! R with r (s) 2 (s) for every s 2 S such that u(s; r; a; t) u(s; r (s); a; t) for every (s; r; a; t) 2 A T , and such that u(s; r (s); a; t)
is lower semicontinuous in (s; t) 2 S T for each a 2 A:
That is, for each s, and independent of a and t; there is a worst reward for the agent.
Example 12 Worst Rewards. If (i) R is partially ordered (Euclidean for example), (ii) a compact subset of R contains for each s a least element of (s) ; and (iii) u is continuous in its arguments and increasing in r; then assumption 13 holds.
Thus, assumption 13 typically holds when r is a reward in the "usual" sense. The following is an example that fails to have simple worst rewards (and thus where our results require uniform information to establish existence).
Example 13
No Worst Reward. Let T = ftg ; let A = R be a …nite set, and for each s 2 S let u (s; r; a; t) = 1, if a = r; zero otherwise.
3 Contracts, Menus, Mechanisms, and the Principal' s Problem
In the introduction, we described the principal's problem as one of choosing a menu of contracts from which the agent chooses. It is well-known that this is without loss of generality by the revelation principle. Indeed, it is equivalent, and again without loss, for the principal to consider only direct mechanisms of the following form.
The agent reports his type and (i) the mechanism speci…es a (possibly randomized) reward as a function of the signal the principal receives (i.e., the mechanism speci…es a contract), and (ii) the mechanism suggests to the agent an action to take. 12 Moreover, the mechanism can be restricted to be incentive compatible in the sense that, regardless of his type, the agent can do no better than to report his type truthfully and to take the suggested action. 13 Because menus of contracts and incentive compatible direct mechanisms are equivalent, we will, for convenience, conduct the analysis in terms of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. We now turn to the formal de…nitions, beginning with the notion of a contract.
Given the generality of the model, randomization over rewards will sometimes be strictly optimal. 14 However, even when randomization is not necessary for optimality, randomization nonetheless lies at the heart of establishing the existence of an optimal mechanism. Indeed, permitting randomized contracts is essential for establishing an appropriate compactness property for the space of contracts. This motivates the following de…nition of a contract, where (Z) denotes the set probability measures on the Borel subsets of any topologized set Z:
for every s 2 S; and (ii) (Bjs) is a measurable function of s on S for every Borel subset B of Rg:
That is, for each s; a contract speci…es a lottery over rewards, with a basic measurability condition as s varies. Of course, randomization is permitted but is not required-for each s there may be a reward, r; such that ( js) places probability one on r:
For 2 K; a 2 A; and t 2 T; de…ne
as the utility to the agent if he faces contract ; takes action a; and has type t; and let L ( ; a; t) = Z l(s; r; a; t)d (rjs)dP (sja; t)
denote the principal's expected losses. Because utility and losses are nonnegative, both integrals exist but could take on the value +1:
For each reported type of the agent, a mechanism determines a contract and suggests an action to the agent. Formally, we have the following.
De…nition 2 A mechanism is a pair of functions : T ! K; and a : T ! A specifying the contract and suggesting an action for each reported type of the agent. For notational compactness, write t for (t); and a t for a(t): We require a : T ! A to be measurable and R B t (Cjs)dP (sja t ; t) to be measurable as a function from T into the reals, for all Borel subsets B of S and C of R:
The measurability condition on R B t (Cjs)dP (sja t ; t) ensures that the principal can compute expected losses; and one can also compute the agent's ex-ante utility. 15 De…nition 3 The mechanism ( ; a) is incentive compatible at t if it is optimal for the agent of type t to announce his true type and to take action a t : That is,
Finally, we have, De…nition 4 A mechanism is incentive compatible if it is incentive compatible at H-a.e. t 2 T:
For any mechanism ( ; a); let
be the principal's expected loss assuming that the agent tells the truth and takes the recommended action for all t.
Although not explicitly modeled, our speci…cation of the principal's problem easily allows the presence of interim individual rationality constraints for the agent. 16 To see this, suppose that the 1 5 In particular, the condition ensures that for any measurable function g :
g(s; r; at; t)d t(rjs)dP (sjat; t)dH(t) exists. One might instead ask for the stronger condition that t(C js) be jointly measurable in (s; t): Demonstrating the existence of such an optimal mechanism would require an extra step in an already lengthy proof. 1 6 Such constraints arise when the agent must commit to participating in the mechanism only after learning his type.
agent has an outside option, u 0 (t), that may depend upon his type. The corresponding interim IR constraints can be incorporated by adding a distinct and isolated action a 0 to A and de…ning u (r; s; a 0 ; t) = u 0 (t) for all (r; s; t) and similarly de…ning l (r; s; a 0 ; t) to be the loss to the principal when the agent exercises his outside option. 17 4 The Main Existence Result Theorem 1 Suppose that assumptions 1-11 hold and that the environment has either uniform information or simple worst rewards, i.e., either assumption 12 or 13 also holds. If L( ; a) is …nite for some incentive compatible mechanism ( ; a); then the principal's problem (1) possesses a solution.
Proof Sketch for Pure Moral Hazard
A good deal of the e¤ort in proving Theorem 1 is spent on the case of simple worst rewards without uniform information, and on establishing measurability of the mechanism in the agent's type when T is uncountable. Nonetheless, it is useful to illustrate some of the main ideas in the simpler environment of uniform information and pure moral hazard (T a singleton).
The challenge is to rule out examples along the lines of Mirrlees (1999) , where the "optimum" can be arbitrarily closely approximated but never achieved. Let c < 1 be the loss from some feasible contract and the action it implements. Given the compactness of A; it would be su¢ cient to establish that if n is a sequence of contracts implementing actions a n ! a with L ( n ; a n ) c; then there is a contract 2 K implementing a with L ( ; a ) lim n L ( n ; a n ) : 18
Note that n and P ( ja n ) together induce a distribution n on S R: The distribution n is similar in spirit to a distributional strategy (Milgrom and Weber (1985) ). Prohorov's theorem states that if the sequence n is tight, then it converges along a subsequence to some . 19 The tightness of the sequence n hinges on our assumption that l ( ) is bounded from below. Together with the boundedness of the sequence L ( n ; a n ) of expected losses, this implies that rewards leading to large losses must be rare. Tightness follows because we also assume, roughly, that sets of rewards leading to bounded losses are compact. Our candidate contract will be ; a regular conditional probability of . Several issues must be adressed.
First, because l( ) and u( ) are lower semicontinuous and bounded below, but not necessarily bounded above, limits of their expectations under n need not be equal to their expectations under : For example, suppose that R = [0; 1); and consider the sequence of contracts in which, regardless of the signal, the reward is n with probability 1=n and 0 with probability (n 1) =n: If l (s; r; a) = r; then, L ( n ; a n ) = 1 for all n: However, under ; rewards are zero with probability 1 and so L ( ; a ) = 0: Consequently, L ( ; a ) < lim n L ( n ; a n ) in this example, a result that generalizes. Indeed, by the portmanteau theorem, 20 our lower semicontinuity and lower bound assumptions imply that limits of expectations of l( ) and u( ) under n are no less than their expectations under the weak limit so that, in particular, the desired inequality L ( ; a ) lim n L ( n ; a n ) follows.
It remains to ensure that implements a : For this, the implication of the portmanteau theorem-that expectations cannot jump up in the limit-is not enough. Indeed, if the utility of the implemented action jumps down in the limit, incentive compatibility can fail. The role of assumption 8 is to ensure that the agent's utility does not jump down. To see how this works, return to the example in the previous paragraph and suppose that u (s; r; a) = v (r) a; where v is utility over wealth. Then U ( n ; a n ) =
n v (0) a n : By assumption 8, 1 n v (n) ! 0 as n ! 1, and so it follows that U ( n ; a n ) ! v (0) a = U ( ; a ) : Thus, in the example, while the loss to the principal jumps down in the limit, the utility of the agent converges. In general, assumption 8 permits us to show that U ( ; a ) = lim n U ( n ; a n ):
Of course, what we must show is that U ( ; a ) U ( ; a) for every a 6 = a : Because n implements a n for every n; it su¢ ces to show that for any a 6 = a ; Z u (s; r; a n ) d n (rjs) dP (sja n )
implies
By uniform information, we can write the right-hand side of (3) as Z u (s; r; a) (s; a; a n ) d n (rjs) dP (sja n ) = Z u (s; r; a) (s; a; a n ) d n ;
and the right-hand side of (4) as Z u (s; r; a) (s; a; a ) d (rjs) dP (sja ) = Z u (s; r; a) (s; a; a ) d :
Since utility is bounded from below, and since u (s; r; a) (s; a; a n ) is lower semicontinuous by assumption, the portmanteau theorem can be used to show that the liminf of the right-hand side of 2 0 See, e.g., van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), Theorem 1.3.4.
(5) is at least as large as the right-hand side of (6): Hence, the desired inequality follows because, by (2), the left-hand side of (3); which is simply U ( n ; a n ); converges to the left-hand side of (4);
which is simply U ( ; a ).
Additional issues arise when the support of the signal distribution varies, for example, with the agent's action. In that case, uniform information fails and (5) need not hold. With uniform information, knowing the (randomized) reward that the limit contract speci…es for almost every signal generated by the action a ties down the (randomized) reward speci…ed for almost every signal generated by any other a in an incentive compatible manner. On the other hand, if some set of signalsŜ has zero probability for all a in a neighborhood of a ; then puts no weight on s; r pairs with s 2Ŝ: Consequently, the conditional probability of ; which forms the basis for de…ning the candidate limit contract, is arbitrary onŜ, providing no guidance whatsoever in how the contract should be de…ned there. But, sinceŜ may receive positive probability when actions outside the neighborhood of a are taken, de…ning the contract appropriately onŜ is critical. It is here that the assumption of simple worst rewards is very helpful, as it allows us to specify a reward onŜ that, no matter what the agent's type and action, is as bad as it gets for the agent.
Proof of Theorem 1
For 2 K and (a; t) 2 A T; let = P ( ja; t) denote the probability measure on S R de…ned for all Borel subsets B of S and C of R by
Note that 2 ( ) because ( (s)js) = 1 for every s 2 S: We begin with a critical preliminary result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that assumptions 1-11 hold and that the environment has either uniform information or simple worst rewards, i.e., either assumption 12 or 13 also holds. Let n be a sequence of contracts in K; let a n be a sequence of actions in A converging to a 2 A; and let t n be a sequence of types in T converging to t 2 T: If L( n ; a n ; t n ) is bounded above, then there is a subsequence, n j of n; and a contract 2 K such that (i) n j P ( ja n j ; t n j ) converges to P ( ja ; t )
(ii) lim j L( n j ; a n j ; t n j ) L( ; a ; t );
(iii) lim j U ( n j ; a n j ; t n j ) = U ( ; a ; t ) < 1; and (iv) lim j U ( n j ; a 0 ; t 0 j ) U ( ; a 0 ; t 0 ) for all (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a ; t ) and for all t 0 j ! t 0 :
That is, there is a contract, ; such that as we pass from ( n ; a n ; t n ) to ( ; a ; t ); the principal's losses can only fall, the agent's utility from taking the suggested action along the sequence of types in question converges, and the agent's utility from taking any other action along a sequence of types converging to any other type can only fall.
Existence of an optimal contract for the case of pure moral hazard is immediate from this proposition, as in the sketch. It also follows for the case of pure moral hazard that if a can be implemented by some contract, then there exists a least-cost way of implementing a:
Corollary 1 Suppose that T is a singleton and the environment has either uniform information or simple worst rewards. If an action a is optimal for the agent under some contract with …nite expected losses to the principal then there is a contract that minimizes the principal's losses subject to implementing a.
Proof of Proposition 1. By hypothesis, L ( n ; a n ; t n ) = Z l(s; r; a n ; t n )d n (rjs)dP (sja n ; t n )
is bounded above by, say c < 1:
Throughout the proof the ordered pairs (s; r) are restricted to the feasible set and we omit explicit mention of this where convenient. The symbol x denotes the Dirac measure placing probability one on x:
There are …ve steps. At
Step 5, the proof di¤ers signi…cantly depending on which case we are in.
Step 1. We …rst show that the sequence n = n P ( ja n ; t n ) is tight. Fix " > 0: Because S is Polish and P ( ja n ; t n ) ! P ( ja ; t ); the sequence P ( ja n ; t n ) is a tight subset of (S) by Prohorov's theorem. Consequently, there is a compact subset C of S such that P (Cja n ; t n ) 1 " 2 for every n: Also, for every > 0; c L ( n ; a n ; t n ) = Z l(s; r; a n ; t n )d n (rjs)dP (sja n ; t n ) Z l(s;r;an;tn)> l(s; r; a n ; t n )d n (rjs)dP (sja n ; t n ) n (l(s; r; a n ; t n ) > ); for every n; where the second inequality follows because l is nonnegative. Therefore, setting = 2c="; n (l(s; r; a n ; t n ) > ) "=2; for every n:
Letting D n = f(s; r) 2 : s 2 C and l(s; r; a n ; t n ) g and noting that P ( ja n ; t n ) is the marginal of n on S; we have n (D n ) = 1 n (f(s; r) 2 : s 2 C and l(s; r; a n ; t n ) > g) P (SnCja n ; t n ) 1 " 2
Let Y be the compact subset C ft ; t 1 ; t 2 ; :::g of S T: Clearly, the union D 1 [ D 2 [ ::: is contained in the projection onto of f(s; r; a; t) 2 A T : (s; t) 2 Y and l(s; r; a; t) g; a compact set by assumption 7. Each n therefore places weight at least 1 " on the compact projection onto , and so, since " > 0 was arbitrary, f n g is a tight subset of ( ).
Step 2. We next de…ne the requisite contract 2 K and establish (i). Since the sequence n is tight, by Prohorov's theorem there is a subsequence, n j ; such that n j ! for some 2 ( ).
Reindexing the subsequence, we have n ! : Because P ( ja n ; t n ) is the marginal of n on S and P ( ja n ; t n ) ! P ( ja ; t ); the marginal of on S is P ( ja ; t ): Consequently, there is a regular conditional probability where (Bjs) is measurable in s on S; and where (because ( ) = 1) ( js) 2 ( (s)) for all s 2 S , where S is a measurable subset of S satisfying P (S ja ; t ) = 1:
In the uniform information case, de…ne 2 K as follows. For every Borel subset B of R and every s 2 S; For the simple worst reward case, let S a ;t be as given by assumption 10, and de…ne 2 K as follows. For every Borel subset B of R and every s 2 S;
;
if s 2 S a ;t \ S ;
otherwise. 21 In either case, because (Bjs) = (Bjs) for P ( ja ; t ) almost every s;
for all Borel subsets B of R and D of S:
Therefore, n P ( ja n ; t n ) = n ! = P ( ja ; t ); proving (i).
Step 3. In this step we demonstrate (ii) as follows.
lim n L( n ; a n ; t n ) = lim n Z l(s; r; a n ; t n )d n = lim n To see the inequality, note …rst that n (an;tn) ! (a ;t ) by Billingsley (1999) Theorem 2.8 (ii), since n ! and (an;tn) ! (a ;t ) : The inequality then follows from the portmanteau theorem since l is lower semi-continuous (van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), Theorem 1.3.4).
Step 4. In this step we demonstrate (iii), i.e., R u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n ! R u(s; r; a ; t )d < 1:
Given our assumptions on u; this would follow directly from weak convergence if in addition u were bounded. However, because u need not be bounded, some extra care must be taken here.
Let u m (s; r; a; t) = min(u(s; r; a; t); m): For every n; Z u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n = Z u m (s; r; a n ; t n )d n + Z u(s;r;an;tn)>m (u(s; r; a n ; t n ) m)d n :
Consider the last term. Let x m be the supremum of u(s; r; a; t)=l(s; r; a; t) over all (s; r; a; t) 2 A T such that u(s; r; a; t) > m (and where the sup of the empty set is zero). Then, Z u(s;r;an;tn)>m (u(s; r; a n ; t n ) m)d n Z u(s;r;an;tn)>m u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n = Z u(s;r;an;tn)>m u(s; r; a n ; t n ) l(s; r; a n ; t n ) l(s; r; a n ; t n )d n x m Z l(s; r; a n ; t n )d n = x m L( n ; a n ; t n )
x m c:
Hence, Z u m (s; r; a n ; t n )d n Z u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n Z u m (s; r; a n ; t n )d n + x m c;
where the second inequality follows from (7) :
To see that R u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n is bounded, …x some m large enough that x m is …nite (such an m exists by assumption 8), and note that (8) implies that for all n; Z u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n Z u m (s; r; a n ; t n )d n + x m c m + x m c:
For any m; u m is bounded and continuous, and so, as in step 3, Z u m (s; r; a n ; t n )d n ! Z u m (s; r; a ; t )d :
Hence, from (8) we have Z u m (s; r; a ; t )d lim n Z u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n lim n Z u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n Z u m (s; r; a ; t )d +x m c:
Because lim m x m = 0 by assumption 8, and because lim m R u m (s; r; a ; t )d = R u(s; r; a ; t )d
by the monotone convergence theorem, we conclude that lim n R u(s; r; a n ; t n )d n exists, is …nite, and is equal to R u(s; r; a ; t )d :
Step 5. In this step, we demonstrate (iv), i.e., lim n U ( n ; a 0 ; t 0 n ) U ( ; a 0 ; t 0 ) for all (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a ; t ) and for all t 0 n ! t 0 : Here, the details are very di¤erent depending on the setting.
Uniform Information. Fix (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a ; t ). For every n U ( n ; a 0 ; t n ; a n ; t n d n (rjs)dP (sja n ; t n ) = Z u(s; r; a 0 ; t 0 n ) s; a 0 ; t 0 n ; a n ; t n d n ;
where the second equality is valid because S a 0 ;tn = S an ; tn = S in the uniform information case.
Hence, where the inequality follows as in step 3 using assumption 11.
Simple Worst Rewards. To keep the notation manageable in this step, for X S we shall write R X to mean the integral over all (r; s) 2 with s 2 X: For any set B and " > 0; let B " denote the open set of points whose distance from B is strictly less than ":
Fix (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a ; t ). Let F be a closed subset of S a ;t : By assumption 13,
The second term on the right-hand side is at least
since u 0 and where F " denotes the closure of F " : By assumption 10, and the de…nition of ; the …rst term on the right-hand side is Z Sa n;tn \F " u(s; r; a 0 ; t 0 n ) (s; a 0 ; t 0 n ; a n ; t n )d n (rjs)dP (sja n ; t n )
u(s; r; a 0 ; t 0 n ) (s; a 0 ; t 0 n ; a n ; t n )d n = Z u(s; r; a 0 ; t 0 n )I F " (s) (s; a 0 ; t 0 n ; a n ; t n )d n ;
where the …rst equality uses P (S an;tn ja n ; t n ) = 1.
Since F " is open, I F " (s) is lower semicontinuous. Consequently, since (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a ; t ) ; and by assumption 11, u(s; r; a 0 ; t 0 n )I F " (s) (s; a 0 ; t 0 n ; a n ; t n ) is lower semicontinuous at (s; r; a 0 ; t 0 ; a ; t ) for every (s; r) 2 : Similarly, since F " is closed, 1 I F " (s) u(s; r (s); a 0 ; t) is lower semicontinuous in (s; t) on S T by assumption 13. Therefore, because a n ! a ; t n ! t ; P ( ja; t n ) ! P ( ja; t ); P ( ja; t 0 n ) ! P ( ja; t 0 ) and n ! ; it follows from (10) and (11) as in step 3 that
Taking the limit of the right-hand side as " ! 0, noting that both I F " (s) and I F " (s) & " I F (s) for every s 2 S; and applying the monotone convergence theorem,
Being a Borel probability measure on a Polish space, P ( ja ; t ) is regular. Consequently, there is an increasing sequence F 1 F 2 F 3 ::: of closed subsets of S a ;t such that P ([ m F m ja ; t ) = 1:
Substituting F m into the right-hand side of the previous expression and noting that I Fm (s) % m I [mFm (s) for every s 2 S, the monotone convergence theorem implies that where the second inequality follows because P (S a ;t n ([ m F m ))ja ; t ) = 0 (…rst term) and because ; and where the second equality follows because ( js) = r (s) for s 2 S c a ;t :
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. By hypothesis, the set of incentive compatible mechanisms ( ; a) such that L ( ; a) is …nite is nonempty. We must show that L ( ; a) achieves a minimum on this set. Choose any sequence of incentive compatible mechanisms ( n ; a n ) such that L ( n ; a n ) converges to some c < 1: It su¢ ces to show that there is an incentive compatible mechanism ( ; a ) such that
The proof would be quite straightforward if there were a subsequence along which n t and a n t converged pointwise for H-a.e. t 2 T: 22 But there need not exist any such subsequence when T is uncountable. Consequently, the proof strategy is to (step I) restrict attention to a carefully chosen countable dense subset of types and a carefully chosen subsequence for which n t and a n t have appropriate limits for each type t in the countable set. Then it is shown (step II) that the limit mechanism satis…es the incentive constraint when reports are restricted to the countable set. Next, it is shown (steps III and IV) that the limit mechanism can be extended to the entire set of types,
T; in a measurable and incentive compatible manner, thereby producing an incentive compatible mechanism ( ; a ): Finally, owing to the carefully chosen subsequence from step I, it is shown (step V) that ( ; a ) satis…es (12). 2 2 This discussion is informal. We do not de…ne a topology on the space of contracts, K:
Step I. Because the countable intersection of measure one sets is measure one, there is a measurable subset T 0 of T with H (T 0 ) = 1 such that for all n; and for all t 2 T 0 ; ( n ; a n ) is incentive compatible at t.
For each n; and for each t 2 T; de…ne L n (t) = L ( n t ; a n t ; t). Then each L n is a [0; +1]-valued measurable function, due to the measurability properties of n and a n ; and because l( ) is lower semicontinuous and therefore measurable.
Because T 0 is a subset of the separable metric space T; it is itself separable metric. Hence, restricting each L n to T 0 , Lemma 1 (see Appendix) together with the boundedness of L ( n ; a n ) and the compactness of A imply that there is a subsequence n j and a countable dense subset T 0 of T 0 such that, (a) a
we have L (t) < 1 for every t 2 T 0 and it remains the case that H(T 0 ) = 1: Moreover, by (a), no t 2 T 0 is removed from T 0 and so T 0 T 0 continues to hold.
By (b) and (ii 0
Step II. In this step, we show that ((^ t ;â t )) t2T 0 satis…es the incentive constraints for each t 2 T 0 when reports are restricted to T 0 : For all t; t 0 2 T 0 and all a 0 2 A;
where the equality follows from (iii 0 ) and the inequality follows because each mechanism ( n ; a n )
is incentive compatible at every t 2 T 0 T 0 . Consequently, reversing the roles of t and t 0 in (iv 0 ), we have
whenever (a 0 ; t) 6 = (â t 0 ; t 0 ): But because (14) clearly holds when (a 0 ; t 0 ) = (â t ; t); (14) holds for all t 0 ; t 2 T 0 and all a 0 2 A; as desired.
Step III. Because T is Polish H is regular. Hence, the measure of T 0 can be approximated arbitrarily well by the measure of compact subsets of T 0 . Since each such compact subset is itself Polish, we may apply Lusin's theorem to obtain a sequence T 1 ; T 2 ; ::: of compact subsets of T 0 whose union, T 2 B(T ); has measure one under H; and on each of which L is continuous.
For each t 2 T ; let F (t) denote the set of ( ; a) in ( ) A such that for some sequence t j in T 0 converging to t;
That is, F (t) is the set of all ( ; a) that are limits of pairs (^ t j ;â t j ) for types t j 2 T 0 near t whose associated contracts^ t j yield expected losses to the principal that, in the limit, are no more than L (t) when the agent takes actionâ t j and is type t j : We claim that the correspondence F : T ( ) A is nonempty-valued, closed-valued, and measurable.
Nonempty-valued. Fix t 2 T : By (c), there is a sequence t j in T 0 converging to t such that
Therefore, by the compactness of A and by (i) of Proposition 1, there is a subsequence along which
Closed-valued. Follows similarly from a straightforward diagonal argument.
Measurable. Let C be a closed set in ( ) A. We wish to show that
where
For each m; we may choose j large enough so that de…ning t 0 m = t mj ; we have t 0 m within distance 1=m of t m ; (^ ); therefore also converges to ( 0 ; a 0 ) along this subsequence. Hence, because C is closed, ( 0 ; a 0 ) 2 C and we are done.
Step IV. We now de…ne the mechanism ( ; a ) and show that it is incentive compatible. Since and the discussion therein (p.863) that measurability of F implies weak measurability, that F has a measurable selection. That is, for each t 2 T there exists ( t ; a t ) 2 F (t) such that ( t ; a t ); as a function from T into ( ) A; is measurable.
For each t 2 T ; the de…nition of F (t) implies that there exists a sequence t j in T 0 converging to t such that (^ t j ;â t j ) ! ( t ; a t ). For typical elements t; t 0 2 T ; we denote their corresponding sequences by t j and t 0 j : By Proposition 1, for each t 2 T ; there is a contract t 2 K such that;
(i 00 )^ t j =^ t j P ( jâ t j ; t j ) converges to t P ( ja t ; t);
(iii 00 ) lim j U (^ t j ;â t j ; t j ) = U ( t ; a t ; t) < 1; and
Consequently, by (i 00 ), t = t P ( ja t ; t) for every t 2 T : Having de…ned ( t ; a t ) for each t 2 T ; we now extend to all of T: Fix some t 0 2 T and let ( 0 ; a 0 ) = ( t 0 ; a t 0 ): For t 2 T nT ; de…ne ( t ; a t ) = ( 0 ; a 0 ): Consequently, a t is measurable as a function from T into A; and for every measurable subset B of R and D of S; R D t (Bjs)dP (sja t ; t) is measurable as a function from T into R; because t = t P ( ja t ; t) is a measurable function of t into ( ): 24 Given these measurability properties, we have therefore de…ned a mechanism ( ; a ) : It remains to show that it is incentive compatible. Indeed, it su¢ ces to show incentive compatibility at each t 2 T because H(T ) = 1:
Reporting a type in T nT is equivalent to reporting t 0 2 T . Consequently, it su¢ ces to show that for all t; t 0 2 T ; and all a 0 2 A with (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a t ; t);
But the equality follows from (iii 00 ), the …rst inequality follows from (14) , and the …nal inequality follows by reversing the roles of t and t 0 and the roles of t j and t 0 j in (iv 00 ), so long as (a 0 ; t) 6 = (a t 0 ; t 0 ); or equivalently, so long as (a 0 ; t 0 ) 6 = (a t ; t); as desired.
Step V. For t 2 T ; ( t ; a t ) 2 F (t) implies that (^ t j ;â t j ) ! ( t ; a t ) and lim j L ^ t j ;â t j ; t j L (t)
for some sequence t j in T 0 converging to t: Consequently,
where the second line follows from the portmanteau theorem. Therefore, since H (T ) = 1;
c; 2 4 To see measurability, de…ne for each measurable Z 2 , gZ : ( ) ! R by gZ ( ) = R IZ (s; r)d (s; r); and de…ne h : T ! ( ) by h(t) = t : Then, as a real-valued function of t; R D t (Bjs)dP (sja t ; t) is the composition of gB D and h: By construction, h; our selection from F; is measurable. Hence, it su¢ ces to show that gZ is measurable. But this follows from the fact that gZ is lower semicontinuous (and therefore measurable) for each open set Z and that the collection of Borel sets Z for which gZ is measurable is a Dynkin class, which, containing the open sets must therefore consist of all the Borel sets as desired.
where the last inequality follows from (13).
Randomization and Optimal Contracts
In much of this section, we specialize to the case of pure moral hazard (and so drop the notation t) and provide several results relating to the use of randomization in optimal contracts. Our …nal result returns to the setting including adverse selection.
It is well known that contracts involving randomization over rewards may or may not be necessary for creating optimal incentives. For example, Holmström's (1979) su¢ cient statistic result yields as a corollary that randomization is undesirable when the agent's utility function displays risk aversion and is additively separable in e¤ort and one-dimensional rewards, and the principal's pro…t function displays risk aversion and strictly decreases when higher rewards are given to the agent. See also Grossman and Hart (1983) . On the other hand, Gjesdal (1982) , and Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) provide examples in which randomization is desirable. The following result is an important stepping stone to a generalization (Corollary 2) of Holmström's corollary on the optimality of deterministic contracts and provides some insight into the nature of contracts when randomization is necessary for the principal to achieve optimality.
Theorem 2 Suppose assumptions 1-6 are satis…ed and that u (s; r; a) = v (s; r) c (s; a) ; so that for each s; utility is additively separable in rewards and actions. Suppose also that 2 K achieves a minimum expected loss for the principal subject to implementing a 2 A; and that this loss is …nite.
If is closed, then for P ( ja)-a.e. s 2 S; ( js) solves
That is, the principal, for each signal, chooses a least cost means of delivering the utility in question. This is intuitively obvious, as otherwise, changing the contract to deliver the same utility at each s more cheaply leaves the incentives of the agent una¤ected (for each action, given the additive separability assumed) and the principal better o¤. The only issue is in the technicality of showing that such changes can be made in a measurable fashion as s varies. The proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 permits a rather general result on the redundancy of randomization. We'll need the following de…nition.
De…nition 5 Say that the principal and the agent have weakly con ‡icting preferences over rewards if whenever u(s; r; a) > u(s; r 0 ; a) for r; r 0 2 (s) ; then there exists r 00 2 (s) such that u(s; r 00 ; a) = u(s; r 0 ; a) and l(s; r 00 ; a) < l(s; r; a):
Thus the principal and agent have weakly con ‡icting preferences over rewards if whenever the principal can reduce the agent's utility to a given level by changing the reward, he can reduce the agent's utility to the same level and decrease his losses. Weakly con ‡icting preferences are present in the classic moral hazard problem with one-dimensional rewards because the principal's losses strictly fall when the (monetary) reward to the agent falls. Indeed, in the classic problem the principal and the agent have diametrically opposed preferences over rewards. When the reward space is multidimensional, it would be far too restrictive to assume that their preferences are diametrically opposed, i.e., that the principal's losses are an increasing function of the agent's utility. On the other hand, weakly con ‡icting preferences can easily arise even when the reward space is multidimensional as the following example illustrates.
Example 14 Weakly Con ‡icting Preferences. For each s 2 S; (s) = R = R n + : For each a 2 A and each s 2 S; u(s; 0; a) u(s; r; a) for all r 2 R; and l(s; ; a) is strictly increasing coordinatewise. Weakly con ‡icting preferences holds because for any r; r 0 2 R n + with u(s; r; a) > u(s; r 0 ; a), either l (s; r 0 ; a) < l (s; r; a) ; and we are done, or set r 00 as an appropriate convex combination of r and 0. is concave in r 2 (s), (iv) l (s; r; a) is convex in r 2 (s); and (v) the principal and agent have weakly con ‡icting preferences over rewards. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 2, if some contract 2 K achieves a …nite minimum expected loss for the principal subject to implementing a 2 A, then some deterministic contract does so as well. Moreover, if for P ( ja)-a.e. s 2 S; either u(s; ; a) is strictly concave or l(s; ; a) is strictly convex, 25 then the loss minimizing contract subject to implementing a is unique and deterministic, each up to events of P ( ja) measure zero. where the last weak inequality follows because l is convex in r: Theorem 2 therefore implies that the inequality in (16) can be strict for at most a P ( ja)-measure zero subset of S: 26 Consequently, u(s; r(s); a) = R R u(s; r; a)d (rjs) for P ( ja)-a.e. s 2 S and therefore, again by Theorem 2, l(s; r(s); a) = R R l(s; r; a)d (rjs) for P ( ja)-a.e. s 2 S. These two equalities imply that the deterministic contract r( ) implements a; proving the …rst part of the result, and Jensen's inequality applied to the two equalities proves the deterministic piece of the second part. For the uniqueness piece of the second part, simply note that if two deterministic contracts are optimal and di¤er on a set of P ( ja) positive measure, the randomized contract where after any signal a fair coin determines which of the two speci…ed rewards is given to the agent, is also optimal, contradicting the deterministic piece of the second part.
Randomization can be necessary for optimality for example when risk-aversion fails over some range of rewards or when the reward and signal spaces display some discreteness. In the latter case, randomization convexi…es the set of rewards. 27 Example 15 Promotion. The action space (e¤ ort) is A = [0; 0:5]; the reward space is R = fP; Dg; i.e., "promote (P )" and "don't promote (D)," and the signal space is S = fsucceed; f ailg: Suppose u (s; r; a) = v r 1 2 a 2 and l(s; r; a) = c r s ; where
succeed = 1 and f ail = 0: Finally, suppose that Pr (succeedja) = a: Any cost minimizing contract for e¤ ort level a uses D in the event of 'f ail'; and P with some probability given 'succeed': The e¤ ort level implemented is then
with expected cost to the principal
Hence, the principal chooses a 2 [0; 0:5] to maximize a a
so that the optimal e¤ ort level is
Comparing, with (17);
So, for c P > 1 2 ; optimization requires randomization.
Even when there is randomization, Theorem 2 has strong implications. For example, assume that R = R N ; that rewards on the n-th coordinate can be continuously varied, and that the principal's losses are linear in that coordinate. Then, except in so much as the feasibility constraint (s)
precludes it, the principal will equalize the marginal utility of this reward across any randomization taking place among other coordinates. The following example illustrates. 
and, as before, for appropriate c P ; the principal's optimum will involve 2 (0; 1) : But, the concavity of utility in the monetary coordinate of utility together with Theorem 2 also imply
so that the agent's marginal utility of income, in the event of success, is equalized across whether he is promoted or not. Indeed, if this were not the case then increasing payments where marginal utility is low and decreasing them where marginal utility is high can be done in a way that maintains the same expected utility for the agent,and yet reduces the principal's losses.
Our second result on the redundancy of randomization is based upon a puri…cation result due to Dvoretsky et. al. (1951) . The version of their result used here is distinct from, although related to, the version used in the puri…cation literature in game theory (see Milgrom and Weber (1985) ). 28 We do not impose any of the assumptions from previous sections here. We require only that u( ) and l( ) are real-valued measurable functions on A T and that (s) = R for all s 2 S: However, in contrast to the previous results, we require that A and T are …nite, and that R is compact.
Theorem 3 If A and T are …nite, R is a compact metric space, (s) = R for all s 2 S; and P ( ja; t) is atomless for every (a; t) 2 A T; then either the principal's problem, (1), has a solution that is deterministic, or it has no solution at all. Consequently, under the additional hypotheses of Theorem 1, the principal's problem has a deterministic solution.
Proof: Suppose that ( 0 ; a 0 ) is an incentive compatible mechanism. Let w 1 ( ) = u( ) and w 2 ( ) = l( ): Consider …rst the case in which R is …nite. Following Dvoretsky, Wald, and Wolfowitz (1951), henceforth DWW, for each r 2 R; a 2 A; t 0 2 T; and n 2 f1; 2g; let for each r 2 R; a 2 A, t 0 2 T; and n 2 f1; 2g:
Hence, for each a 2 A; t; t 0 2 T and n 2 f1; 2g; for each a 2 A; and t; t 0 2 T; from which it follows that the deterministic mechanism ( ; a 0 )
is incentive compatible and yields the same losses to the principal as the incentive compatible mechanism ( 0 ; a 0 ): The desired conclusions follow.
The remaining case, in which R is a compact metric space, is handled as in Section 4 of DWW.
7 Appendix.
Lemma 1 Suppose that X is a separable metric space, that H is a probability measure on the Borel subsets of X whose support is X; and that g n is a sequence of integrable [0; +1]-valued functions on X such that R X g n dH is bounded. Then there is a subsequence n j and a countable dense subset X 0 of X such that, (i) lim j g n j (x) is …nite for every x 2 X 0 ; and (ii) For every x 2 X there is a sequence x m in X 0 converging to x such that It is implicit in (i) and (ii) when writing "lim" that the associated limit (which may be +1) exists.
Proof. Let be an upper bound for the sequence R X g n dH: Because the support of H is X; H(U ) > 0 for any open subset U of X: Hence, setting = 1=H(U ) gives
where the …rst inequality uses Fatou's Lemma.
Fix a countable dense subset of X and let U 1 ; U 2 ; ::: be a list of the countably many open subsets of X that are open balls with rational radii centered around points in the countable dense set. We now construct X 0 inductively. First choose x 1 2 U 1 such that, lim n g n (x 1 ) 1 inf
lim n g n (x);
and choose fn 1 (j)g j ; a subsequence of fng; such that lim j g n 1 (j) (x 1 ) = lim n g n (x 1 ):
Next, choose x 2 2 U 2 such that,
lim j g n 1 (j) (x);
and choose fn 2 (j)g j ; a subsequence of fn 1 (j)g j ; such that lim j g n 2 (j) (x 2 ) = lim j g n 1 (j) (x 2 ):
Continuing this process, for each k; choose x k 2 U k such that,
and choose fn k (j)g j ; a subsequence of fn k 1 (j)g j ; such that lim j g n k (j) (x k ) = lim j g n k 1 (j) (x k ):
We claim that (i) and (ii) are satis…ed by setting X 0 = fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::g and de…ning n j = n j (j).
Indeed, because for each k; fn j g j k is a subsequence of fn k (j)g j 1 ; lim j g n j (x k ) exists and is equal to lim j g n k (j) (x k ): Moreover, both limits are …nite in view of their construction and (18). Hence, (i) is satis…ed. To see that (ii) is also satis…ed, consider any x 2 X: Choose U k containing x: Then, lim j g n j (x k ) = lim j g n k 1 (j) (x k ) and (19) imply that,
where the second inequality follows because fn j g j k 1 is a subsequence of fn k 1 (j)g j 1 and because x 2 U k : By considering a sequence of U k containing x such that the associated sequence of x k converges to x as k ! 1; (ii) follows by taking the limit over an appropriate subsequence of fkg in the left-hand side of (20) .
Finally, because fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::g is, by construction, dense in X; the result follows. 
implies that^ yields the principal strictly lower losses than -contradicting that is optimal.
Hence, it su¢ ces to show that F admits a selection that isŜ \ B(S)-measurable.
BothŜ and (R) are Polish, the latter because R is Polish (see Billingsley, (1999) Theorem 6.8, p. 73). By Wagner (1977) Theorem 4.1 and the discussion therein (p.863) that measurability of F implies weak measurability, it su¢ ces to show that F has a closed graph.
So, suppose n 2 F (s n ), s n ! s ; and n ! . We must show that 2 F (s ): BecauseŜ is closed, s 2Ŝ: Because is closed, 2 ( (s )): 30 Similar to steps 3 and 4 in the proof of Proposition 1 (but treating s n here as a n there) we have that (step 3) R l(s ; r; a)d lim n R l(s n ; r; a)d n and (step 4) lim n R u(s n ; r; a)d n = R u(s ; r; a)d : Hence, the continuity of u and l onŜ imply that 2 F (s ):
